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NOTE
THE CONSTITUTION AS CHAPERON: PRESIDENT
CLINTON'S FLIRTATION WITH GAYS IN THE
MILITARY
I. INTRODUCTION
President Clinton probably did not anticipate the backlash that his unsuccessful
attempt to allow avowed homosexuals to serve in the military would unleash. What
began as a campaign promise to "end the ban," resulted in no meaningful change at
all. In fact, the only difference from previous policy is that recruits no longer will be
preemptively questioned as to their sexual orientation.' Needless to say, the final out-
come was a disappointment to the vocal homosexual lobby.2
After apparently realizing that an executive order attempting to change the policy
wholesale would have been unconstitutional (and perhaps politically reckless), as this
Note will demonstrate, the President shifted his efforts toward amending the policy so
as not to discriminate against homosexuals based on "status alone," a meaningless
distinction. This retreat by the President was precipitated by a proposal put forward by
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (backed by Republican Sena-
tors Dan Coats and Strom Thurmond, also Committee members) to write the old poli-
cy into federal law. In response, the President accepted then-Defense Secretary Les
Aspin's recommendation to slightly amend the old policy as mentioned above. That
change then became federal law, as Congress enacted the new policy as part of the
Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Act.
In so doing, Congress has prevented future Presidents from repeating President
Clinton's almost-mistake. President Clinton was premature in promising something
which he alone could not deliver, and the mainstream press fostered the misconception
that the President had plenary power to change the policy to admit homosexuals into
the military, thus misleading the American public. This Note will demonstrate that in
fact the President had no power to change the ban against homosexuals in the military
and, instead, would have been usurping Congress' power had he attempted the change
unilaterally.
Part II will focus on the constitutional powers of the legislative and executive
branches with regard to the military. Specifically, the discussion will identify the appli-
cable constitutional provisions, revisit the Supreme Court's seminal case on presiden-
tial power, and distinguish President Truman's use of his power to racially integrate
1. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1673 (1993).
2. For example, Clinton adviser David Mixner, a prominent advocate of homosexual rights, told
a church convention after the new policy was announced that he "stood before them in great pain,"
deeply disappointed in a plan "that merely gift-wraps a horrendous policy of prejudice and hatred."
Carol Sowers, Clinton Campaign Adviser Assails 'Don't Ask' Gay Policy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 21,
1993, at A2.
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the military from the case of admitting homosexuals into the military. This Note will
also point out where the mainstream press blundered in explaining this complicated
matter to the American people. Part III details examples of Congress' use of its mili-
tary powers and demonstrates how the Supreme Court has recognized Congress' exclu-
sive authority in that area. Part IV explains how any member of Congress by himself
could have thwarted the President, had President Clinton taken The New York Times'
advice and lifted the ban by fiat. Specifically, a federal court decision issued just prior
to Operation Desert Storm suggests how a congressional plaintiff could have his con-
stitutionally-ordained power protected in court. Part V discusses the "new" policy and
argues ultimately that the new policy is a reflection of the old policy. Finally, Part VI
offers some concluding thoughts regarding the President's unconstitutional attempt to
admit homosexuals into the military.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY
A. The Constitution
Congress has the power "[t]o raise and support armies .... [t]o provide and
maintain a navy," and "[t]o make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."3 On the other hand, the Constitution provides that "[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
4
In its most essential form, the President exercises his Commander-in-Chief power
when he commits troops in conjunction with foreign policy goals or national defense.
In that case, it is undisputed within the parameters of the War Powers Resolution' that
the President has the power to dictate objectives and missions to military authorities.
Beyond that core authority, the President has Commander-in-Chief power to commis-
sion officers (within the manpower guidelines set by Congress)6 and to appoint senior
flag-rank (e.g., generals and admirals) officers to various command and staff positions
(again, however, with senatorial approval).7
Finally, with regard to policy, the president may issue executive orders. "Execu-
tive orders are usually defined as presidential directives issued to federal government
officials or agencies.",8 "In issuing an executive order, the President must conform to
the standards laid down in a Congressional delegation of authority, and must also
state the existence of the particular circumstances and conditions which authorize such
order."'9 "Presidential ... orders have the force and effect of laws when issued pursu-
ant to a statutory mandate or delegation of authority from Congress."10
The popular notion after President Clinton made his Veteran's Day 1992 an-
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
5. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (1991).
6. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 522-523 (1993).
7. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 152(a), 154(a)(1) (1993).
8. Steven Ostrow, Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659 (1987).
9. Robert B. Cash, Note, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Orders, 39
NOTRE DAME LAW. 44, 50 (1963) (emphasis added) (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935)).
10. Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
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nouncement that he intended to keep his campaign promise to "lift the ban" was that
he could do so by simply issuing an executive order." The New York Times reported,
"[t]he current regulations prohibit homosexuals from serving in the uniformed servic-
es .... [The ban] can be lifted by an executive order of the President." 2 In a differ-
ent article the same day the Times explained that "it is more likely that the ban will be
lifted immediately, allowing homosexuals to enlist in the services and enabling existing
service members to stop hiding their sexual orientation." 3
Such incomplete explanations were not, however, limited to The New York
Times. Eighteen days earlier, David Wood wrote in The Houston Chronicle that
"[s]ince the ban is policy and not law, it can be reversed by the president without legal
or congressional debate."'4 Ellen Debenport of the St. Petersburg Times added,
"[niow the realization has set in that, among his enormous powers, this new young
President could change military culture next year with the stroke of a pen." 5 One
journalist, however, recognized that the issue was not so simple. The Atlanta Journal
and Constitution's Robert Akerman wrote:
Under the U.S. Constitution, the President is commander in chief of the armed
forces and has power to issue executive orders related to that function. The Con-
gress also has power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces." If these two branches of government should disagree, we would
have a problem. 6
Nevertheless, since the national focus was on "Should he or shouldn't he?" in-
stead of "Can he unilaterally?", it is no wonder that Clinton adviser David Mixner was
so upset in July since just the previous November he was quoted as saying, "I don't
think there will be any kind of fine lines drawn or lengthy executive order .... The
only commitment he made was that there'd be no discrimination against gays in the
military in the future."'"
This early lack of reporting sophistication, though, was unnecessary because a
cursory reading of the Constitution would have alerted reporters that at best, allowing
homosexuals to serve was a two-way decision. Furthermore, investigation into constitu-
tional law would have uncovered the following similar incident which the Supreme
Court thwarted.
B. The Steel Seizure Case
During the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the nation's steel mills to prevent a
11. Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton to Open Military's Ranks to Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1992, at A1.
12. Id. at A22.
13. Eric Schmitt, THE TRANSITION: News Analysis-Challenging the Military; In Promising to
End Ban on Homosexuals, Clinton is Confronting a Wall of Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at
A22.
14. David Wood, Pentagon Pressured to Admit Gays into Armed Forces, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 25,
1992, at A23.
15. Ellen Debenport, Clinton's Promise to Allow Gays in Military Stirs Debate, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at IA.
16. Robert Akerman, Who Makes the Decision on Gays in Services?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST.,
Nov. 13, 1992, at A12.
17. Schmitt, supra note 13.
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threatened shutdown resulting from a labor dispute. The mill owners sued to prevent
execution of the order, arguing that the order amounted to lawmaking, a legislative
function which the Constitution explicitly granted to Congress and not the President."
In striking the order, the Supreme Court explained, "[tihe President's power, if any, to
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself."' 9
Justice Jackson, in his famous concurrence from that case, elaborated on this
idea. He explained that three possible scenarios exist which circumscribe the
President's executive order power. First, "[wihen the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."
Second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon-his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain."'"
Third, "[wihen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon




The Constitution expressly places in Congress power "to raise and support Armies"
and "to provide and maintain a Navy." (Emphasis supplied.) This certainly lays
upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces .... While
Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only
Congress can provide him an army or navy to command. It is also empowered to
make rules for the "Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces," by
which it may to some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions.23
In promising to end the ban, President Clinton was attempting to act against
Congress' will, which I will discuss later. Thus, applying the Court's holding and
Jackson's reasoning to the issue of homosexuals in uniform, it becomes clear that the
President's power is clearly at its "lowest ebb," if it exists at all.
By January, when President Clinton made his first move on the issue as Presi-
dent, the press had caught on that perhaps his power was not unmitigated. The New
York Times editorial page opined:
Now he needs to show that he means it by lifting the ban immediately, by execu-
tive order, and directing the Joint Chiefs to stay strictly away from any lobbying of
Congress to reinstate it.
True, there are risks in swift action. Even many gay leaders and members of
Congress who genuinely want the ban lifted fear that an immediate executive order
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
19. Id. at 585.
20. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 637.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 643-644.
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would spur Congress to overrule Mr. Clinton by a veto-proof margin.'
President Clinton, himself, allowed, "[nlow, I would remind you that any President's
executive order can be overturned by an act of Congress. The President can then veto
the act of Congress and try to have his veto sustained if the act stands on its own."'
But just as the realization hit that a constitutional question existed, the focus
began to turn toward comparing the plight of homosexuals in the military to that of
1940s blacks in the military.26
C. The Comparison to Integration
In one of the most famous executive orders in American history, Executive Or-
der 9981 (July 26, 1948)," President Truman integrated the military. President
Truman's order read as follows:
WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of
the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment
and opportunity for all those who serve in our country's defense:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of
the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as
Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without
regard to race, color, religion or national origin...?4
But the argument that President Clinton could legally admit homosexuals into the
armed services the same way that President Truman racially mixed military units fails.
First, it could be argued that all President Truman was doing was implementing what
the Constitution already required via the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, the President, through Executive Order 9981, was merely ahead of the
Supreme Court's decision in Boiling v. Sharpe,29 where the Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause has an implied equal protection component to it, as
in the Fourteenth Amendment.
With regard to homosexual activity, however, since the Court ruled in 1986 that
there is no fundamental right to consensual homosexual sodomy,3" and lower federal
24. Who's in Charge of the Military?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at A22.
25. Reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at A8.
26. The comparison began implicitly in The New York Times when Eric Schmitt wrote, "As Com-
mander in Chief, Mr. Clinton can impose his order on the armed forces, just as President Harry S.
Truman did in 1948 when he ordered the integration of the Army, and Mr. Clinton's aides say he
will do that shortly after he becomes President on January 20." Schmitt, supra note 13, at Al.
Then in a flurry, the Times published three op-ed pieces within a week attempting to make the
comparison. See A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind; General Powell and The Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1993, at A23; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Issue Is Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at
A27; Lucian K. Truscott IV, Truman's Legacy to Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at A19.
Finally, a law review piece came out which, in part, also made the comparison. See Kurt D.
Hermansen, Comment, Analyzing the Military's Justifications for its Exclusionary Policy: Fifty Years
Without a Rational Basis, 26 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1992).
27. 3 C.F.R. 772 (1943-1948 compilation).
28. Id.
29. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (federal companion case to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), thereby overturning
"separate but equal" doctrine).
30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
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courts have consistently and nearly unanimously refused to apply any type of height-
ened scrutiny to military regulations aimed at punishing homosexual conduct,3 an
Equal Protection/Due Process argument is unavailable.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has narrowed its interpretation of Bill of Rights
coverage to military members. In 1969, the Court had ruled in O'Callahan v. Parker32
that for members to be prosecuted under the UCMJ, the conduct in question had to be
"service related."3 But then in 1987 the Court expressly overruled O'Callahan in
Solorio v. United States,' holding that status as a service member, and not service-
relatedness of the conduct in question, was sufficient for trial by court-martial under
the UCMJ.33 Therefore, while it seems largely accepted that racial discrimination in
the military would be unconstitutional, it is far less clear that even if a right to homo-
sexual conduct existed, that the Court would so apply that right to service members.
More importantly, however, Executive Order 9981 can clearly be seen as an act
within the realm of the President's Commander-in-Chief power since all President
Truman essentially did was "rearrange" troops which were already legally within his
command, and under the guidelines for admission set up by Congress. With integra-
tion, blacks were already legally in the armed services making up all-black units
whereas homosexuals have not been. A comparable executive order allowing the enlist-
ment of homosexuals and/or retention of homosexuals who are already surreptitiously
in the military would have necessitated changing the guidelines which Congress had
31. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990);
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220
(10th Cir. 1984); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 792, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 905 (1980) (plaintiff Belier), 454 U.S. 855 (1981) (plaintiff Miller) (three cases consolidated); but
see Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense, 808 F.Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Dahl v.
Secretary of the Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 439 (D.C.
1993).
Additionally, Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 655
(1992), has cast some doubt on the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence in this area. On one hand, the Pruitt
court stated, "to the degree that Belier . . . rested on prejudice of others against homosexuals them-
selves, rather than on disapproval of specific acts of criminal conduct, its reasoning is undercut by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Palmore [and] Cleburne." Id. at 1165. On the other hand, however,
Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993), and United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1025 (1993), cast doubt on Pruitt. Heller explained that, "a State ...has no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification." 113 S.Ct. at
2643. Harding adds that, "in establishing a statutory classification, one need not ... supply empirical
evidence to support a rational relationship." 971 F.2d at 412.
Also, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated a prior ruling by a three-judge panel of that
Circuit in Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (1993), which struck down the pre-Clinton policy on homosexu-
als as unconstitutional. This unusual move (since the Justice Department did not request it) by a ma-
jority of the Circuit indicates probable reversal on the en banc rehearing. Eric Schmitt, Court to Re-
consider Ruling Voiding Military's Gay Ban, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 8, 1994, at 7.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court unanimously stayed Judge Hatter's
order from Meinhold prohibiting the entire Department of Defense from discharging homosexuals based
on their orientation or homosexual conduct. No. CV 92-6044 TJH (JRx), filed September 30, 1993.
Instead, the Court limited Judge Hatter's application strictly to Meinhold's case pending disposition of
the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. United States Department of Defense v. Meinhold, 114 S.Ct. 374
(1993).
32. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
33. Id. at 272-73.
34. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).




Using Justice Jackson's analysis of the executive and legislative powers at issue
here, Executive Order 9981 was not in conflict with Jackson's statement that "only
Congress can provide him an army or navy to command," while a pro-homosexual
executive order without corresponding congressional action would have been tanta-
mount to the President "providing" himself a different military than Congress was
willing to provide for him. The distinction at issue here is the difference between
working with elements which another is responsible for supplying you with, and decid-
ing in the first instance which elements you want. It seems that the President here was
attempting to do the latter, whereas the Constitution only grants him authority for the
former. In fact,'the President's usurping power in this area would be the same as
Congress deciding where to commit forces in battle, which is clearly a Commander-in-
Chief function. In short, admitting homosexuals is a separation of powers matter, the
bounds of which the President may have exceeded.
Aside from constitutional arguments, though, are the opinions of black military
leaders, many of whom reject the comparison of homosexuality to race. Lieutenant
General Calvin A.H. Waller, U.S. Army (Retired), deputy commander of Operation
Desert Storm, notes a fundamental difference between skin color and sexual orienta-
tion: "[tihere's no question that they're being treated differently based on their life-
style. But I don't think that you can say that what we're doing to homosexuals in this
day and age is the same thing that we did to minorities in an earlier time," he said."
Retired Army Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton concurs by stating he finds the
comparison "offensive."3 Army Lieutenant General Samuel E. Ebbesen released a
statement saying that he "personally resents" the comparison between blacks and
gays.39 Finally, and perhaps most compelling, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Army General Colin L. Powell wrote in a May 1992 letter to Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-Colo.):
I can assure you I need no reminders concerning the history of African-Americans
in the defense of their Nation and the tribulations they faced. I am a part of that
history.
Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is
perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the
two is a convenient but invalid argument.'
Significantly, noted military sociologist Charles Moskos4t of Northwestern Uni-
versity also agrees that the comparison does not fit. He points out that integration of
the military resulted not from a desire for fairness, but instead a decision that integrat-
36. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988) (prohibiting sodomy); see discussion infra part 1II.
37. Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels--Gays and Blacks; Linking Military Ban to Integration Fight
Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Colin L. Powell, Letter to Representative Patricia Schroeder, May 8, 1992. (Extracted from
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, David F. Burelli, "Homosexuals and U.S. Military
Personnel Policy," (Jan. 14, 1993)).
41. Whom The Wall Street Journal called "the most influential military sociologist in the country"
and who also supported Bill Clinton for President. Tom Philpott, Spotlight is on Moskos, ARMY TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 16.
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ed units would be more effective in battle (with the Korean War looming)." While 97
percent of active-duty flag officers (generals and admirals) favor the ban on homosexu-
als43 (and nearly three-quarters of enlisted personnel oppose lifting the ban'), only
about a third of white soldiers objected to racial integration at that time.45
III. EXAMPLES OF CONGRESS' CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS RELATED
TO THE MILITARY
In a 1981 case, Rostker v. Goldberg,' the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to the male-only draft registration provision of the Military Selective Service Act.47
The Court explained:
The "specific findings" section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by stating:
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively (emphasis
added) to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and
maintain a Navy, and make rules for Government and regulation of the land and
naval forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the discretion of the
Congress to determine the occasions for expansion of our Armed Forces, and
the means best suited to such expansion should it prove necessary.
This Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad constitutional power" to
raise and regulate armies and navies. As the Court noted in considering a challenge
to the selective service laws: "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and
sweeping."4s
The Court also pointed out that "[tihe grant of constitutional authority is, after all, to
Congress and not to the Executive or military officials."49
Two years later, in Chappell v. Wallace," where the Court ruled that enlisted
military personnel were prohibited from seeking damages relief from their superior
officers for alleged violations of constitutional rights, the Court reiterated:
Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors
of military life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian
life .... Their response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress 'To
raise and support Armies'; 'To provide and maintain a Navy'; and 'To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.' It is clear that
the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over
rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment,
including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline; and
42. Duke, supra note 37.
43. Rowan Scarborough, Top Brass Hope Ban is Retained; GOP Survey Finds 97% Oppose Ho-
mosexuals in the Military, WASH. TIMS, July 1, 1993, at A3. 621 of 1,040 generals and admirals
responded to the confidential mail survey.
44. Melissa Healy, Senators Hear Sailors' Fears on Gays in Service, L.A. TtMES, May 11, 1993,
at Al.
45. Duke, supra note 37.
46. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
47. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III).
48. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968); See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755 (1948)) (other citations omitted).
49. Id. at 80 n.15.
50. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that view."
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that the framers made an intentional and
explicit decision to vest Congress with the powers enumerated and associated with
Article I, Section 8, Clauses 12-14. In exercising its powers under Article I, Section 8,
Congress has implicitly stated its position regarding homosexuals in the military
through laws regulating military service. For example, Congress enacted the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"),"2 which is a subset of federal penal law that only
applies to members of the military.53 Among the provisions of the UCMJ is Article
125 (Sodomy), which proscribes "unnatural carnal copulation with another person of
the same or opposite sex. '
Congress has also required that the Punitive Articles of the UCMJ must be ex-
plained to all service members within six days of the commencement of active duty,
after completion of six months on active duty, and at every reenlistment thereafter.5
Along with the explanation requirement, enlisted service members are required to take
an enlistment oath which binds them to "obey ... orders ... according to regulations
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice."' Although less specific than the UCMJ,
the oath of office required of all military officers states, "I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter." 7 These duties in-
clude administering non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ (for minor
UCMJ infractions) and preferring charges (i.e., judicial proceedings) against their sub-
ordinates for possible trial by court-martial when more serious violations have oc-
curred.
Coupled with the required oaths and explanation/enforcement requirements are
laws regulating fraudulent and unlawful enlistments/appointments."8 The sections
which address fraudulent enlistment and unlawful enlistment cover homosexuals. These
provisions mandate dismissal from the service, among other penalties.59 Thus, Con-
gress has established a framework whereby all soldiers are given notice from the be-
ginning of their enlistments that sodomy is unlawful; has required that all enlisted
service members swear out an oath to obey all UCMJ provisions; and has required all
officers to swear an oath to discharge the duties of their office, which includes enforc-
ing the UCMJ. This includes enforcing the prohibition on sodomy, and discharging
those who have fraudulently/unlawfully enlisted. Congress' intent could hardly be more
clear.
But Congress has even been more explicit than that.' While amending Title 10
51. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-01 (1983) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
52. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 877-934 (1983 & West Supp. 1993) [hereinafter UCMJ].
53. The Supreme Court has explained, "'There can be no question but that Clause 14 grants the
Congress power to adopt the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S.
234, 247 (1960).
54. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
55. 10 U.S.C.A. § 937 (West Supp. 1993).
56. 10 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West Supp. 1993).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1988).
58. Fraudulent enlistments refer to "knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to
qualifications ...." 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1988). Unlawful enlistments relate to those "ineligible" for
service. 10 U.S.C. § 884 (1988).
59. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-820, 883-884 (1988).
60. I thank John C. Murdock, Notre Dame Law School Class of 1994, for his work on much of
the following material through the end of Section I1. He included parts of it in a Memorandum of
1994]
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in 1958, Congress expressed its intent to administratively discharge commissioned or
warrant officers who possessed a homosexual orientation.6' Specifically, the report
stated that it was amending 10 U.S.C. sections 3258, 3448,62 8258, and 844863 for
the purpose of facilitating a general discharge "under circumstances which clearly
indicate that he (the servicemember) is not qualified for further military service. '
One of the circumstances which the report mentioned as grounds for disqualifying a
commissioned or warrant officer from further service was "homosexual tendencies not
manifested by overt acts while in the service."65 In other words, a homosexual orien-
tation or tendency alone, without any homosexual conduct, was seen by Congress as
justifiable grounds for dismissal.
Finally, under 10 U.S.C. section 5947, entitled "Requirement of Exemplary Con-
duct," Congress charged all "commanding officers and others in authority in the naval
service" with the following duty:
[To] show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordi-
nation; ... to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices ...
and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and
customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical
well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their
command or charge.'
Since Congress made it clear that homosexual conduct (i.e., sodomy) is forbidden in
the military,67 and it seems transparent that the only reason for prohibiting sodomy
would be on moral grounds, "dissolute and immoral practices" under the above statute
must be construed to include sodomy. And because naval officers are required by law
to "guard against" or prevent the occurrence of sodomy, this mandate would require
the exclusion of homosexuals as a necessary precaution to prevent the unnatural acts
proscribed by the sodomy statute." Congress evidently enacted section 5947 because
of the unique demands of the military lifestyle, a lifestyle with which homosexuality
and other "immoral practices" are incompatible.
Title 10's existence also means that any executive branch policy on this issue
(pre-Clinton) had been enacted necessarily in accordance with congressional policy,
and not of the President's own volition. While Congress has delegated to the service
secretaries the power to prescribe regulations establishing the grounds for early dis-
charge of enlisted service members, such power must be exercised in accordance with
the law Congress has enacted (i.e., the UCMJ). The Supreme Court has explained this
idea with regard to another executive agency by stating:
This is not to say that any grant of legislative authority to a federal agency
by Congress must be specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to it can be
Law which he submitted to Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, in the Spring of 1993.
61. S. REP. No. 1864, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3296.
62. Repealed in 1980.
63. Repealed in 1980.
64. S. REP. No. 1864, supra note 61.
65. Id.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 5947 (1988).
67. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
68. This presumes that homosexuals will engage in sodomy. While it may be argued that a homo-
sexual could serve in the military and not engage in homosexual activity, this seems rather implausible
in the vast majority of cases. See infra note 93.
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binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes. What is important is that the re-
viewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority contem-
plates the regulations issued.'
Pursuant to congressional delegation and the Supreme Court's guidance, pre-Clinton
administrations drafted regulations which made homosexual orientation grounds for
discharge.7"
Also within Title 10, Congress chose to delegate some of its plenary powers
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 (the "make rules" clause) to the President.7 The
delegation states, "[tihe President may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions,
powers, and duties under this title." The Constitution, however, circumscribes how far
a President can extend this delegation; for all Presidents are bound to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."72 The punitive provisions of Title 10 are federal law.
Therefore, any Executive policies working against their spirit would consequently be
void. More importantly, the President would be in violation of his constitutional duty.
As early as 1842, the Supreme Court held that rules and regulations which are
promulgated by the executive branch, by virtue of the Commander-in-Chief powers,
are binding upon the armed forces to the extent that such edicts are "within the sphere
of his legal and constitutional authority." 3 Forty-four years later, in United States v.
Symonds,74 the Supreme Court qualified the executive branch's legal authority to reg-
ulate, order or instruct the naval forces by holding that:
The authority of the Secretary [of the Navy] to issue orders, regulations, and in-
structions, with the approval of the President, in reference to matters connected
with the naval establishment, is subject to the condition, necessarily implied, that
they must be consistent with the statutes which have been enacted by Congress in
reference to the navy. He may, with the approval of the President, establish regula-
tions in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with, the statutes
defining his powers or conferring rights upon others. The contrary has never been
held by this court."
In summary, the President currently has two sources of power by which he can
regulate the armed forces. First, the President can regulate within the scope of the
delegated powers given to him by Congress under Title 10. Second, despite the plenary
congressional powers of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, the Supreme Court has held
that the powers of the Commander in Chief also include an inherent power to regulate
the armed forces.76 Importantly, these inherent regulatory powers are qualified by the
69. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979) (emphasis added).
70. See D.O.D. Directive No. 1332.14 (1982), and 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1993). Commis-
sioned officers were separated for cause pursuant to D.O.D. Directive No. 1332.30 (1986). Also,
D.O.D. Directive No. 6130.3 (1986) listed homosexuality as a mental disorder which disqualifies homo-
sexuals who are candidates for enlistment, commission, or induction.
71. 10 U.S.C. § 121 (1988); see also 10 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) (referring to the Secretary of De-
fense).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
73. United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1842).
74. 120 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1886).
75. Id.
76. __ [Ilit has not yet been definitely established to what extent the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, or his delegates, can promulgate, supplement or
change substantive military law as well as the procedures of military courts in time of
1994]
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requirement that they must be consistent with, not contrary to, the statutory scheme
made pursuant to Congress' plenary powers. Again, the Court has already illuminated
the President's power in this area:
Section 201 of Executive Order 11246 directs the Secretary of Labor to
"adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deems necessary and
appropriate to achieve the purposes thereof." But in order for such regulations to
have the "force and effect of law," it is necessary to establish a nexus between the
regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Con-
gress.'
Thus, the fundamental problem remains that Congress never intended to admit homo-
sexuals into the military; therefore, the President could not do so alone. If he tried,
then it would be up to the courts to act, provided that a proper plaintiff brought suit.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DELLUMS V. BUSH
During the build-up prior to Operation Desert Storm, Representative Dellums and
53 other members of Congress (including one senator) unsuccessfully filed suit to
enjoin President Bush from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without a decla-
ration of war or other explicit congressional authorization. In discussing Congress'
power "[t]o declare [wiar" under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, U.S. District Judge
Harold Greene explained:
While the Constitution itself speaks only of the congressional power to de-
clare war, it is silent on the issue of the effect of a congressional vote that war not
be initiated. However, if the War Clause is to have its normal meaning, it excludes
from the power to declare war all branches other than the Congress."
By analogy, this explanation would also apply to Clauses 12-14, especially with regard
to governing and regulating the armed forces. In other words, the President should
normally be excluded from raising, supporting, providing, maintaining, and regulating
the armed forces, since the Constitution assigns those powers to Congress.
In the end, however, Dellums was decided on ripeness grounds. The court rea-
soned:
It would be both premature and presumptuous for the Court to render a
decision on the issue of whether a declaration of war is required at this time or in
the near future when the Congress has provided no indication whether it deems
such a declaration either necessary, on the one hand, or imprudent, on the other. 9
By so ruling, the court followed Justice Powell's proposal from Goldwater v. Cart-
er,80 where he reasoned in concurrence that "'a dispute between Congress and the
peace, or in time of war .... If the President can provide rules of substantive law as
well as procedure, then he and his military subordinates exercise legislative, executive
and judicial powers with respect to those subject to military trials. Such blending of
functions in one branch of the Government is the objectionable thing which the drafts-
men of the Constitution endeavored to prevent by providing for the separation of gov-
ernmental powers.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1957) (footnote omitted).
77. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979) (emphasis added).
78. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990).
79. Id. at 1149-50 (footnote omitted).
80. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action
asserting its constitutional authority.""'8 Justice Powell would require a constitutional
impasse between the political branches before the Judiciary would step in. Judge
Greene interpreted this to mean, "unless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is
heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of
the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration
power that it may be entitled to receive it.""2
Regarding homosexuality, a "majority" of Congress had been heard from via
Title 10. Therefore, the only requirement that a congressional plaintiff would have had
to meet in order to enjoin the President from singlehandedly overturning the ban is
standing. Again, Dellums is of assistance. Judge Greene applied a two-part test from
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc. 3 and Allen v. Wright,' which requires a plaintiff to allege: (1) that he
personally suffered actual or threatened injury, and (2) that the injury can be traced
fairly to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a decision in favor of
the plaintiff.'
More in accord with the hypothetical situation whereby President Clinton would
have attempted unilaterally to overturn the policy without congressional assent, Moore
v. United States House of Representatives,86 held that "where a congressional plaintiff
suffers 'unconstitutional deprivations of [his] constitutional duties or rights ... if the
injuries are specific and discernible,' a finding of harm sufficient to support standing is
justified."8 This holding intimates that any single member of Congress could sue to
prevent execution of an executive order overturning the ban, since such an executive
order would be a substantial step toward condoning sodomy in the ranks, against
Congress' explicit intent.
Single-member standing also alleviates a problem alluded to in Dames & Moore
v. Regan,"5 which held that Congress implicitly approved a longstanding practice of
foreign claims settlement by executive agreement. In Dames & Moore, the Court relied
heavily on the fact that Congress tolerated "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned .. 9
This has never been the case with homosexuals in the military.
Moreover, Dames & Moore upheld "the President's action in nullifying the at-
tachments and ordering the transfer of the assets ... pursuant to specific congressional
authorization."' Thus, President Carter's action in that case stands in opposition to
President Clinton's proposed executive order which would have had no corresponding
congressional authorization. Finally, Dames & Moore-type acquiescence requires thirty
years or more of congressional silence.9
81. 752 F. Supp. at 1150 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997).
82. 752 F. Supp. at 1151.
83. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
84. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
85. 752 F. Supp. at 1147.
86. 733 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
87. 752 F. Supp. at 1147 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 952).
88. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
89. Id. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)).
90. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
91. In Dames & Moore, the Court observed that the President had entered into at least ten bind-
ing settlements with foreign nations which Congress implicitly approved from 1952 until the Executive
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At best, then, the most that a President could hope for were he to take an execu-
tive order-only approach to changing the policy on homosexuals would be "a healthy
deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs ....""
Thus, a court could conceivably read the President's Commander-in-Chief power
broadly to allow him to change the policy at will. Such a judicial decision, however,
would be unwise.
First, and most practically, without a corresponding change in the UCMJ, a situa-
tion would then exist where homosexuals could be "lawfully" enlisted but then shortly
thereafter punished for violating Article 125 (Sodomy). On the other hand, President
Clinton's desire was to allow enlistment only of those who admit to homosexual incli-
nations and therefore were previously prohibited, but who assert that they will not
engage in homosexual conduct.93 Nevertheless, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out,
"acknowledgement, if not an admission of its practice, at least can rationally and rea-
sonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity to engage in homo-
sexual conduct .... [Ilt is compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and is
likely to again engage in such conduct."' Effectively, then, extreme judicial defer-
ence to an executive order without corresponding legislative action would amount to a
catch-22.
Furthermore, if a court deferred to an executive order change of policy on this
matter, it would have to ignore James Madison's writings when he defended the Con-
stitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate branches of govern-
ment. He wrote that separation of powers, "does not mean that these (three) depart-
ments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul [sic] over the acts of each
other," but rather "that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted."95
The Court also recognized this idea in Bowsher v. Synar,9 when it noted:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal
Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to
assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself
to its assignee responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desir-
able objectives, must be resisted.'
So even if a popular consensus would ever be reached to allow homosexuals to serve
in the military, Congress would have to cooperate in changing the policy.
Orders at issue in the case were promulgated in 1981. Id. at 680-86.
92. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981).
93. This dilemma is still, as yet, unclear. In theory a "homosexual" who neither admits nor acts
on that description may serve. The obvious question, however, is whether such a person is meaningful-
ly homosexual. In any case, since Congress has written the new policy into law, the problem that
could have resulted has been somewhat avoided.
94. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (J.Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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V. THE OLD AND THE NEW
So what has transpired? If one compares the "new" policy, which is now federal
law, with the old, which was a Department of Defense regulation, it becomes readily
apparent that except for the recommendation to continue not asking recruits about their
sexual orientation, the policies are not different from one another.98 Indeed, the vote
breakdown would indicate that the new legislation is essentially conservative, with
liberal Democrats such as Senators Kennedy and Lieberman having opposed it in
Committee," thereby giving further indication that any change lacked much sub-
stance. Even the "rebuttable presumption" exception whereby an individual may claim
that he is homosexual, but may then disprove that, is no change from previous Depart-
ment of Defense Policy.1" One must ask, of course, given the social stigmatization
98. "The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to en-
gage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." Pub. L. No. 103-
160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1671 (1993).
This statement and the rest of the Committee's proposed legislation bears a striking resem-
blance to the previous )epartment of Defense policy. Compare with 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, Pt. 1,
Para. H (1993), which said:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military envi-
ronment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements,
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accom-
plishment of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely affects the
ability of the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster
mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system
of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of
servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording
minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain the
public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
99. See Senate panel approves Clinton policy on gays in the military, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July
23, 1993.
100. Compare the current law, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1671-72 (1993):
(B) Policy.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the
following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such
regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to
engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further findings, made and ap-
proved in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations, that the member
has demonstrated that-
(A) Such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behav-
ior;
(B) Such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimida-
tion;
(D) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued pres-
ence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces in
proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) The member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words
to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved in accordance
with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated that
he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the
same biological sex.
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of homosexuality, why a person who does not engage in or intend to engage in homo-
sexual conduct would ever say he is a homosexual. Thus, for a person to say that he is
a homosexual must mean that he either truly does intend to engage in prohibited con-
duct, or is merely seeking an early discharge.
The new legislation does not address when a commander has enough evidence to
investigate, but it defies reason to think that the executive branch would discourage
military officers fr. ,n investigating instances of homosexuality (i.e., sodomy infrac-
tions) occurring in their commands. Under the new policy, "credible information" will
be required before launching an investigation.'' This does not include investigations
solely to determine an otherwise unimplicated soldier's sexual orientation during secu-
rity clearance checks."l Nor does it include investigations based only on the mere
allegation or statement of another, or rumors/suspicion;0 3 although it could include a
statement by a third party who suspects another service member of homosexuality
without having any direct evidence of it."° Instead, the commander must have a rea-
sonable belief based on articulable facts."t° Of course, this raises the question of what
a military prosecutor would do if a commander came to him with credible information
gathered after an initially "capricious" investigation. This scenario indicates that Presi-
dent Clinton's guidelines are necessarily dependent upon self-policing.
More importantly, however, this policy only codifies what has been the practice
up until now. It is appropriate here to point out that the oft-repeated shibboleth that
"witch hunts" were somehow a norm prior to President Clinton is preposterous. Penta-
gon spokesman Doug Hart explained before President Clinton took office that:
The only way an investigation takes place is if there is a criminal act in-
volved .... The stories of witch hunts and exuberant investigations are just not
with the pre-Clinton Policy, 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A, Pt. 1, Para. H (1993):
c. The basis for separation may include preservice, prior service, or current service
conduct or statements. A member shall be separated under this section if one or more of
the following approved findings is made:
(1) The member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to
engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are approved further findings that:
(a) Such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior;
(b) Such conduct under all the circumstances is unlikely to recur;
(c) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation
by the member during a period of military service;
(d) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued pres-
ence in the Service is consistent with the interest of the Service in proper disci-
pline, good order, and morale; and
(e) The member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosexual
acts.
(2) The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless there
is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual.
(3) The member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the
same biological sex (as evidenced by the external anatomy of the persons involved)
unless there are further findings that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual
and that the purpose of the marriage or attempt was the avoidance or termination of
military service.
101. Policy Guidelines, ARMY TiMEs. Aug. 2, 1993, at 13.
102. Field officers have discretion to investigate, The Rules of 'Don't Ask, Tell, Pursue', NAvY
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at 4.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Policy Guidelines, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 13.
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true. A majority of those who are found to be homosexual- are found out through
self-proclamation. Others are found out through complaints or people who turn
them in. Very few are found through investigation."
VI. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
While moral arguments, as well as arguments pertaining to issues of privacy,
exist as to why homosexuals should not be admitted into the military, those arguments
are beyond the constitutional issues addressed in this Note. The Constitution has em-
powered each of the three branches of government with particular powers by which
each branch may effectively represent the people for whom the Constitution was writ-
ten. In attempting to admit homosexuals into the military, the President may have
overstepped the powers which the Constitution delegates to the Executive Branch with
regards to the military. Moreover, the President may have badly miscalculated the
position of the American people on the issue of homosexuality. A 1991 survey con-
ducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago indicated
that 71 percent of Americans felt that sex between homosexuals was always
wrong."° Additionally, 57 percent said that homosexual relations between consenting
adults should not be legal."t
As representatives of the American people, Congress should not capitulate to a
policy which would contravene the position of the American people. The Constitution
has delegated to Congress alone the power to determine the composition of the United
States military. Congress should enjoin any attempt by the President to transgress the
powers which the Constitution has delegated to the Executive Branch. With standing to
enjoin any future attempt by the President to admit homosexuals into the military,
Congress should protect its constitutionally delegated powers in representing the voice
of the American people.
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